With an estimated one hundred and fifteen million children not attending primary school in the developing world, increasing access to education is critical. Resource constraints limit the extent to which demand based subsidies can do so. This paper focuses on a supply-side factor -the availability of low cost teachers -and the resulting ability of the market to offer affordable education. We use data from Pakistan together with official public school construction guidelines to present an Instrumental Variables estimate of the effect of government school construction on private school formation. We find that private schools are three times more likely to emerge in villages with government girls' secondary schools. In contrast, there is little or no relationship between the presence of a private school and pre-existing girls' primary, or boys' primary and secondary schools. Moreover, there are twice as many educated women and private school teachers' wages are 18 percent lower in villages that received a government girls' secondary school. In an environment with poor female education and low mobility, government girls' secondary schools substantially increase the local supply of skilled women. This lowers wages for women in the local labor market and allows the market to offer affordable education. These findings highlight the prominent role of women as teachers in facilitating educational access and resonates with similar historical evidence from developed economies -the students of today are the teachers of tomorrow.
I Introduction
How to improve educational outcomes in low-income countries is one of the central problems in development today. Despite the powerful global consensus created through the Millennium Development Goals, over a third of developing countries are "off-track" in achieving universal primary enrollment by 2015. One explanation for this poor performance is that the demand for education is inefficiently low. This is likely if parents do not fully internalize educational returns for their children, and has lead to prescriptions such as conditional cash transfers (Schultz 2004, Filmer and Schady 2006) . However, the high marginal cost of such programs reduces their practical appeal. 1 In contrast, this paper evaluates the importance of a key supply-side constraint: the availability of affordable teachers in the developing world. Recognizing that education displays inter-temporal complementarities-consumption today facilitates production tomorrow-teacher shortages can pose severe and persistent constraints. In growth models, a high ratio of unskilled to skilled workers in the labor force implies a large skill premium and thus a high relative cost of training the uneducated. When credit markets are imperfect or long-term commitments are not credible, this high cost of training can lead to poverty traps (Ljungqvist 1993 , Banerjee 2004 ).
The potential pool of teachers is extremely limited in many parts of the developing world. , and this concern resonates with the challenges faced in designing incentives for teachers in the public sector, both to move to rural areas (Urquiola and Vegas 2005) and to exert higher effort document the high rate of teacher absenteeism around the developing world). Recent work on the decline in teaching quality in the United States also highlights the link between the supply of teachers and female labor force participation (Corcoran et . al.
2004, Hoxby and Leigh 2004
). Yet there is little micro-evidence that (potential) teacher supply matters and that increasing it will improve educational provision. This paper provides such evidence.
We argue that public investment in education facilitates future education provision by lowering production costs through an increased local pool of potential teachers-the students of today become the teachers of tomorrow. 2 There are two steps to our argument. First, by utilizing school construction guide- 1 Estimates suggest that the cost per marginal child exceeds $9,000 in Mexico and $400 in Pakistan-figures that are very close to the GDP per capita of these countries (de Janvry et. al. 2006 , Chadhury and Parjuli 2006). 2 In the words of a local entrepreneur: "The big problem is teachers. In most villages, I can set up a private school, but who will teach? All the men are working and if I pay them what they want, I will never make a profit. I cannot get women from other villages-who will provide the transport for them if it gets dark? How will she be able to work in another village if she is married? The only way we can work is if there are (local) girls who can teach in the village-that is why I ask if there is an educated girl who can teach. I can pay them Rs.800 ($14) a month and run the school. Otherwise it is not possible."
lines specified under government school expansion programs in Pakistan, we generate exogenous variation in school provision to show that the construction of government girls' secondary schools (henceforth GSS) has a large causal impact on the education market. Villages where such schools were constructed are 36 percentage points (three times) more likely to see private primary schools emerge a decade later. 3 Since in general it is not clear how public provision of education is affected by market forces, the focus on private schools is crucial in helping isolate and interpret the impact on the educational market. 4 In the second step, we argue that this effect works through a teacher supply channel. What helps substantiate this claim is that the context of geographically and occupationally restricted labor markets for women (but not men) generates cross-sectional variation in the impact of public school provision.
In support of a "women as teachers" channel we find that while a GSS matters and its construction leads to a doubling of secondary-educated women in the village, the construction of a government boys' primary/secondary or girls' primary school has no effect on private school existence. Although this is consistent with highly educated mothers being the prime drivers of demand, price movements in the education market provide compelling evidence for a net supply shifter: while educational provision is higher in villages with a GSS, the wages of private school teachers are 18 percent lower in these villages.
The main challenges in identifying the causal impact of GSS on the educational market arise from the potential non-random placement of such schools. In our case, a strong observed correlation between village population and GSS as well as village population and private school existence prevents independent identification of the effect of GSS on private school existence. Our empirical strategy addresses this identification problem through an instrumental variables approach.
We exploit officially stipulated eligibility rules for GSS establishment to construct the instrumental variable. According to these rules, (a) villages with higher population were given a preference for GSS construction as long as; (b) there were no other GSS within a 10 kilometer radius. Using these two guidelines and an administrative unit called the Patwar-Circle (PC) which consists of 4-5 geographically contiguous villages and a land-area approximating the 10 Km radius rule, we argue that villages "eligible" to receive a GSS may be defined as those with the highest population rank within the PC. In the raw data, 9.6 percent of all villages classified as "eligible" in this manner received a GSS compared to 2.9 percent for those classified as ineligible. 3 We focus on the existence of private schools rather than their enrollment share. Most variation in the number of children enrolled in private schools is driven by the extensive (whether or not there is a private school in the village) rather than the intensive (variation in private school enrollment conditional on existence) margin. Our results are similar if we look at private school enrollment. We prefer the extensive margin since the data on enrollments is noisier. 4 The vast majority of these private schools operate in a free and relatively unregulated market as for-profits and are co-educational, English medium schools that offer secular education. Contrary to popular views non-profit schools such as religious schools play a small role in Pakistan, with less than a 1% share of enrollment (Andrabi and others 2006a) . In contrast to the government sector -where teacher hiring is governed by teachers' unions, state-wide hiring regulations and non-transparent processes -private sector investments better reflect local market conditions and thus aid identification of the teacher supply channel.
Non-linearities and discontinuities in the eligibility rule-arising because two villages with equal population may be eligible or not depending on their population rank within their neighbors-allow us to simultaneously control for polynomial effects of the village's own population and that of neighboring villages' populations, which have independent effects on the educational market. Under the assumption that private school placement is not determined in the same non-linear and highly discontinuous fashion as the eligibility rule, the instrumental variables (IV) estimate is consistent and unbiased (Fisher 1976 ).
The IV results suggest that private schools are 36 percentage points (300 percent) more likely to locate in villages with a GSS.
The basic result that private schools are more likely to locate in villages with GSS holds in bivariate tabulations, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and first-difference specifications. There is a consistent increase in the size of the coefficient from 10 percentage points in the OLS to 15 in the first-difference and 36 percentage points in the IV specification. This suggests that GSS were more likely to be built placed in villages where private schools were less likely to arise. As we discuss later, this is consistent with institutional evidence on both equity and political considerations in school construction.
The primary threat to identification of our IV strategy is that unobservable attributes of villages with the highest population rank within a PC (eligible villages) may be directly correlated with the existence of a private school. For instance, if the government used the same strategy for allocating other public investments with an independent effect on the educational market or if the private sector responds to rank conditions in a similar fashion, our estimates will be biased upwards.
In support for the exclusion restriction, the historical record shows that PCs are used only as revenue collection estates, while political representation (and with it the delivery of public services) is centered on the Union-Council, an alternate and non-overlapping classification. This is supported by the data as eligible villages do not differ from others in socio-demographic characteristics and the provision of public investments such as water or electricity. Three falsification tests lend further support.
First, if the private sector responds independently to the population rank condition, we would expect a correlation between private school existence and eligibility even in PCs where no village received a GSS. Instead we confirm that village eligibility is correlated with private school existence only in PCs where at least one village received a GSS; in PCs where no villages received a GSS, the correlation is small and insignificant.
Second, recognizing that PCs vary in geographical area, the radius criteria suggests that the eligibility rule will be stronger in geographically smaller PCs. Interacting eligibility with the area of the PC allows us to use the variation introduced through the interaction as an instrument while controlling directly 4 for the population rank of the village. Again, we find no independent effect of the village population rank and the estimated coefficient of GSS on private school existence is similar to that in the basic IV specification.
Third, we construct a "placebo" experiment by randomly allocating villages to PCs and confirm that it is the actual observed allocation and not village size that drives our results. The estimated coefficient in the observed data lies outside the 99% confidence interval obtained from 5000 draws of the placebo experiment.
This causal impact of GSS construction on private school location captures the joint effect of changes in demand and supply: educated mothers, for instance, could demand greater education for their children.
In support for the "women as teachers" supply channel, we document several findings: (a) private provision is affected only by GSS construction -girls' primary or boys' primary/secondary schools have little effect; (b) GSS more than double the percentage of local secondary-plus educated women and; (c) such women have a large impact on private educational provision while similarly educated men do not.
While these facts can be reconciled with demand-side explanations if demand for education is primarily driven by mothers with secondary education (as opposed to primary education or fathers receiving any level of education), we offer a more conclusive test. This test is based on the effect of GSS construction on private school teachers' wages: demand-side explanations suggest that teacher wages should increase in villages with GSS; supply-side explanations suggest the opposite. In support of the latter, we show that private school teachers' wages are 18 percent lower in villages with GSS. With the teaching wage bill close to 90 percent of schooling costs, this offers a substantial cost advantage for private educational provision. Moreover, consistent with the hypothesized mechanism, we find that this wage drop is lower in villages with more restricted female labor markets as proxied by village development indicators and sex-ratios.
One may wonder about the wider applicability of our results to other countries. Here, it is worth separating the existence of supply-side constraints from its empirical identification. While such constraints are likely to affect educational provision more widely, there are several reasons why Pakistan is particularly well suited for this empirical exercise. First, it has a large for-profit unregulated private sector presence in education, accounting for 35 percent of primary school enrollment. This allows us to use differences in private sector provision as indicators of variation in market forces. Second, government schools are segregated by both gender and level (primary or secondary) and labor markets are occupationally and geographically restricted for women. The combination of locally segmented markets for women with the gender and grade segregation of schools allows us to empirically isolate the impact of the local supply shock on the private education market.
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In environments where labor markets are not geographically limited, the effect of an increase in local supply, while possibly just as important, would be harder to observe in the data since it would vary only at a higher level of geographical aggregation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that supply constraints in the form of teacher shortages are equally binding in, say, Andean villages in Ecuador. However, increasing local supply is not as likely to show a large impact on the local educational market since educated men and women tend to migrate out. Isolating the presence of supply constraints in such environments using cross-sectional variation in the data will be difficult.
Apart from contributing to our understanding of what factors can promote educational provision, a basic result in this paper is that local (teacher) supply curves are not perfectly elastic. While not surprising at the aggregate level, the fact that at the level of the village (our equivalent of an atomistic agent in perfectly competitive markets) prices are a function of local supply leads to several implications for educational policy in low-income countries. 5 We situate this contribution within two broad strands of the literature on educational reform in low-income countries.
Like in the United States (Hanushek 2005 ), a consistent finding from observational and experimental studies in low-income countries is that augmenting teacher resources leads to better outcomes, whether through reducing class-sizes (Case and Deaton 1999, Urquiola 2006), reducing teacher absenteeism, or providing additional teachers for poorly performing students (Banerjee et. al. 2007) . A natural question is whether finding these teachers in the first place is going to be a problem. The only randomized intervention (to our knowledge) that tried to increase the supply of schools through the private educational market failed precisely because teachers could not be found (Alderman et. al., 2003) .
Our results suggest that assuring a supply of teachers in rural areas of low-income countries is indeed a first-order problem that educational systems have to tackle on an urgent basis. Like the theoretical models of Ljungqvist (1993) and Banerjee (2004) , inadequate supply can generate poverty traps in the presence of credit constraints. In such environments, as Banerjee (2004) points out, higher returns to education may lead to declines in the provision of education if the returns increase as a consequence of higher wages in non-teaching professions. An expansion of the secondary schooling system presents the elements of a solution; at the very least, the results suggest that the effects of secondary schooling on the supply of teachers should be directly incorporated into welfare calculations of their potential benefits.
These results are particularly important given a new round of pessimism about public sector provision. In South Asia for instance, the public sector is widely regarded as broken. With teacher absenteeism 5 An upward sloping supply curve at the local level reflects supply constraints in the educational sector as it arises due to local labor market restrictions. There is a natural parallel with the literature on credit constraints. Evidence for such constraints is whether the cost of borrowing increases with the amount for individual firms. Again, that the cost of borrowing increases with the amount at the aggregate level is not surprising; conversely, firm-specific borrowing costs that increase with the amount borrowed lead to several important policy conclusions (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2004 Tooley and Dixon 2005a and 2005b) . The importance of supply-side constraints cautions somewhat against this optimism. First, private sector schools do not arise in a vacuum. Previous public investments "crowd-in" the private sector so that government schools are contemporaneous substitutes but temporal complements with private sector provision. 6 Second, locally upward sloping supply curves have consequences for the pricing of voucher schemes. Depending on the elasticity of supply, increases in demand through vouchers may lead to simultaneous increases in prices, a decline in quality (in price-capped schemes), or both.
The public sector is then left with a tricky task in these environments. If the private sector is indeed to play a role in educational provision, initial investments from the public sector are required to build up the necessary supply of teachers. However, once the private sector enters the local market, the public sector becomes a direct competitor for teachers in a very limited market. Since public school teachers are paid substantially more than their private sector counterparts (5 times more in the case of Pakistan), this direct competition coupled with poor accountability in the government sector now hurts educational provision. If private schools represent an increase in the quality of education rather than a shift in its sectoral composition -and we present prima facie evidence that private schools have led to greater enrollments, higher test test-scores and lower educational costs -then the government has to do enough, but not too much.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II is a brief guide to the institutional context and data, Section III presents the empirical methodology and Section IV the results. Section V concludes.
II Institutional Background and Data

A. The Context
Four characteristics of the Pakistani education system and labor markets are important for this paper. • Private schools operate as for-profit enterprises in a largely unrestricted market-there is no government policy towards subsidizing the private sector in the form of grants to parents or directly to schools. Contrary to popular perceptions, non-profits schools like religious schools account for less than 1 percent of overall enrollment; the majority of private schools in the country offer secular, "English-medium" education (Andrabi et. al. 2006a ).
• Private schools are relatively cheap The median annual fee in a rural private school in Pakistan is Rs.1000 ($18), which represents 4 percent of the GDP per capita. A month's fee is roughly a day's unskilled wage. In contrast, private schools (elementary and secondary) in the United States charged $3,524 in 1991. At 14 percent of GDP per capita, the relative cost of private schooling is 3.5 times higher in the US. Although private schools are more expensive than public schools (which charge no tuition fees), low tuition fees in the private sector have enabled access among low and middle-income segments of the population (Alderman et. al. 2001 ).
• The private sector affordability is primarily driven by the low costs of running a private school.
Despite offering comparable facilities to government schools, per-child spending in rural private schools (Rs. 1012 or $18 annually) is half of that in rural public schools (Rs. 2039 or $36 annually).
These differences remain large and significant after controlling for parental/village wealth and education and stem primarily from lower wages, which account for 90 percent of the overall cost of running a school (Andrabi et. al., 2006b ). The wages of private school teachers are 20 percent that of their public counterparts (Appendix Table I , Panel A).
• The low wage-bill in private schools is partly due to the predominance of locally resident female teachers (over 75 percent of all teachers in the private sector are female) who command lower wages than their male counterparts. With school fixed-effects and controls for education, training, experience and residence, private school female teachers earn 25 percent less than males (Andrabi et. al. 2006c ).
These features of the private sector are consistent with the women as teachers channel identified in the paper. Private schools can benefit from a significant discount in female wages but only if they locate in villages with an assured supply of female teachers, who are hard to find in rural areas. Indeed, the private sector appears to respond to these set of incentives by hiring female teachers who are locally resident.
B. Data
We employ three data sources to examine whether private schools are constrained by the supply of The first sample restriction is necessary since our empirical strategy relies on the availability of village-level baseline data prior to the construction of a public school in the village-for villages with pre-existing girls' schools it is harder to discern whether differences in the baseline data arise from selection into villages or the exposure to a public school. Similarly, the construction of our instrument relies on population data prior to the construction of the school, which is available only for schools constructed after 1981 (for schools constructed before 1981, we can construct our instrument only on the basis of 1981 population data assuming that village population rank within the Patwar Circle is constant over time). The second restriction arises from the concern that pre-existing GSS could have longer term spillover effects for other villages in the geographic vicinity; for instance, spillover effects from inter-village marriages and a secular increase in secondary educated women may well mask the supply-side channels of intrinsic interest. 7 However, our results are not specific to the restricted sample. In the full sample (without any restrictions) both the causal effect of GSS on private school existence and the link between GSS and lower private school teachers' wages remain and are highly significant, though the size of the effect is somewhat smaller (Appendix Table IV ). Conditional on existence, the median age of a GSS is 15 years so that most were constructed early on in the twenty year period. Finally, the number of women reporting secondary or higher education ( 
Some Illustrative Patterns
Figures II and III illustrate the main findings of the paper-the role of GSS and educated women in fostering the growth of private schools. Figure II shows the relationship between the existence of a private school and various types of government schools. We regress the existence of a private school on the number of years that the village has had a government primary or secondary school (both boys'
and girls'). The figure plots the predicted marginal probability of a private school against exposure to a public school; these probabilities are the marginal effect of exposure to each type of public school, controlling for other public schools in the village.
There is almost no association between private school location and the presence of boys' primary schools over the 20-year horizon. The association with girls' primary schools and boys' secondary schools is marginally stronger; the regression implies a 2-3 percentage point increase in the probability of a private school with 10 years of exposure. The role of GSS stands out. There is a private school in 20 percent of all villages with a GSS, or a 7-8 percentage point increase for every additional 10 years of exposure.
The marginal impact of a GSS on private school existence is large and significant. Not surprisingly,
GSS (relative to all other types of public schools) are associated with a significantly higher percentage of women with secondary or higher education in the village. A simple correlation of educated women with exposure to each type of public school shows that every 10 years of GSS exposure more than doubles the percentage of women with secondary or higher education in the village (more than 5 times larger than the impact of any other type of public school exposure). 
III Methodology and Empirical Framework
A simple framework outlines the private entrepreneur's problem, focusing on the role of the public sector and the econometric and interpretational issues in identifying the impact of a GSS on the educational
market. An entrepreneur opens a school in village i if the net return, defined as the difference between total revenues and total costs, is positive. 9 For private schools, school fees and teachers' salaries account for 98.4 percent and 89 percent of total revenues and costs respectively (Andrabi et. al. 2006c ). We write net return as:
where F ee i is the average private school fee for a single student, W age i is the average private school teacher's salary and N i and T i are the number of students enrolled and teachers employed. Since the schooling market may be geographically segregated, we allow wages and fees to differ across villages.
The construction of a GSS increases the supply of teachers in the village, thus affecting W age i ; it also increases the potential demand for schooling, reflected in F ee i . A reduced form expression for net return can then be written as:
where X construction has two effects in Equation (2): It affects the demand for private education by creating a more educated populace through β 1 and the cost of setting up private schools by affecting the local supply of potential teachers through γ 1 . We are interested both in the joint estimation of (β 1 + γ 1 ) and the likely sizes of these two coefficients.
Since the net return a private school earns is not observed, we treat net return in equation (2) as a latent variable in a probability model, so that P rob(P rivateSchoolExists) = P rob(NetReturn i > 0) and estimate a version of Equation (2):
where Pr ivate it is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a private school exists in village i in time t, GSS it is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a GSS exists in village i in time t. X D it observed characteristics village characteristics at time t and S irt are other government schooling options at time t, where each option is indexed by r. The error term, (v i + ε it ) consists of a time-invariant unobserved component, v i and a random component, ε it . The presence of a GSS in village i in time period t is likely a function of the latent unobserved components of the region:
This simple framework highlights the main empirical issues. The OLS estimate of (β 1 + γ 1 ) in Equation (3) is biased and inconsistent if cov(ν i , λ i ) 6 = 0. Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons (1995) show that if cov(ε it , μ it ) = 0, an unbiased estimate of (β 1 + γ 1 ) is obtained with two periods of data by differencing Equation (3) across two different points in time.
where ∆ t represents the difference in the variable over the two observed time periods. We present estimates of (β 1 + γ 1 ) using both regression and first-differenced propensity score matching techniques.
That is, we compare the change in private schools to the change in GSS for matching villages, where the matching is implemented on the baseline data. Differences in the estimated (β 1 + γ 1 ) between Equation(3) and Equation (5) are informative about where GSS were constructed. In particular, an increase in the estimated impact of GSS across the two equations suggests that GSS were selectively built in villages where private schools were less likely to arise.
The estimated (β 1 + γ 1 ) in Equation (5) is still biased if cov(ε it , μ it ) 6 = 0. There are several reasons why this may be so: Jalan and Ravallion (1998) suggest that state-dependence leads to a systematic correlation between initial levels and future growth, violating the "parallel" trends assumption of the first-differenced specification. Alternatively, village-level time-varying shocks could both affect the construction of a GSS and a private school: a new road may lead to better job opportunities, leading to higher demand for a GSS and higher returns to private schools. The particular setting and the program through which the public school construction was undertaken provides a promising instrumentation strategy to address potential correlations in time-varying village attributes; we turn to this next.
A. A Rule-Based Instrumentation Strategy
The instrumental variables strategy follows Campbell [1969] and Angrist and Lavy [1999] . We exploit the fact that the regressor of interest, in our case the construction of a GSS, is partly based on a deterministic function of a known covariate, in our case, village population. If this deterministic function is non-linear and non-monotonic, it can be used as an instrument while directly controlling for linear and polynomial functions of the underlying covariate itself.
GSS construction after 1981 was a direct consequence of the Pakistan Social Action Program in
1980. The GSS constructed under the SAP were not add-on's to existing primary schools but built anew and included primary level classes. Reflecting this design, out of the 328 villages in our sample that received a GSS between 1981 and 2001, only 31 had a pre-existing girls' primary school; in all the rest, the secondary and primary sections of the school were constructed simultaneously. Specific guidelines dictated where these schools could be built. In particular, for GSS the official yardsticks for opening a new school specified a preference for higher village populations and stipulated that there be no other GSS within a 10 kilometer radius.
We construct a binary assignment rule, Rule i for every village that takes the value 1 if the village is the largest village (in terms of 1981 population) amongst nearby villages and 0 otherwise. This captures the radius criteria: if a village is not the largest village amongst its neighbors, the neighbor would receive a GSS first given the stated preference for population. Provided this school is near enough, the village will be less likely to receive its own public school. 11 In the absence of precise geographical data we use the administrative jurisdiction of the "Patwar-Circle" (PC) to approximate the radius rule. In terms of actual land area, this is a reasonable approximation-dividing the size of the province by the number of PCs shows that one school in every PC would satisfy the radius requirements of the rule. Formally:
The eligibility rule is non-linear and non-monotonic-it drops to 0 for larger villages when there is an even larger neighboring village within the PC. In using this rule as an instrument, we are thus able to explicitly control for continuous functions of a village and its neighbors' populations since these covariates may have a direct impact on the existence of a private school. Finally, the existence of a GSS and the presence of a private school are both binary variables. We present estimates based both on a linear and a bivariate probit specification; the latter leads to tighter standard-error bounds, but at the cost of assuming a specific distributional structure for the error terms. Formally the biprobit estimation is specified as follows:
One concern is that population rank-order within a PC is independently correlated with private school existence; in Section IV we discuss the properties of the instrument further and present several robustness tests to check for the validity of the exclusion restriction.
B. Isolating the supply-side
The instrumental variables strategy isolates the causal impact of GSS on private school existence, which jointly captures the effect of GSS on the demand for education and the costs of providing education.
To separate supply from demand-side channels we propose two strategies based on the relative effect of educated women versus educated men in the location decisions of private schools (the quantity margin) and the costs of operating private schools in villages with and without GSS (the price margin).
On the quantity margin, a supply-side channel suggests several patterns. In particular, we expect that (a) since most teachers in private schools report at least secondary education (98 percent), secondary schools should have a larger impact on private school existence than primary schools; (b) the effect of GSS should be larger than that of boys' secondary schools; (c) villages with a GSS should report a larger stock of educated women and; (d) private school existence should respond more to women with higher education than men. While results in the expected direction lend support to the supply-side channel, demand-side explanations based on the relative importance of women versus men or secondary versus primary education in fostering the demand for education cannot be ruled out.
More conclusive evidence for the presence of the supply-side channel comes from the price margin.
The price implications of supply versus demand channels are very different-if private schools locate in villages with a GSS due to increases in demand, we should see an increase in teachers' wages, and conversely if the GSS effect works through the supply channel we should see a decline. One possibility therefore, is to test for differences in skilled women's wages in villages with and without GSS.
The main concern in doing so is a data issue: the only available village-level data that captures skilled women's' wages is the private school census, which records average teacher wages in all private schools. 12 Since we do not observe wages in villages without private schools a simple correlation of wages and GSS may be biased with the bias depending both on how GSS were placed and on the truncation of the wage distribution due to missing wages in villages without private schools. 13 We follow two approaches to address the selection problem. We use a Heckman selection model, where the selection stage is the probability of observing a positive wage, which corresponds to having a private school in the village. Another alternative is to use the "control-function" approach , where we condition on the predicted probability of observing a non-missing value of the wage-bill in the wage equation (Angrist 1995) . Details of both approaches are in Appendix I.
We should caution that we cannot structurally estimate the size of the supply-side effects. For instance, simultaneous changes in the demand for schooling due to GSS construction implies that the supply-side impact of GSS construction on (decreasing) the wage-bill represents a lower bound. Our strategy indicates the presence of a supply-side impact, but has little to say about its size relative to the shift in demand as a result of GSS construction.
IV Results
A. OLS and First-Difference Specifications
We define "treatment" villages as those that received a GSS between 1981 and 2001 and "control" villages as those that did not (these include both villages that did not receive a girls' school at all, or those that received a girls' primary school). Comparing baseline village characteristics in 1981 (literacy indicators, gender ratios and demographic attributes) shows that the only significant differences between treatment and control villages was, consistent with the stated GSS construction guidelines, that the population in treatment villages was almost twice as large as in the control (Appendix Table II). 14 12 An alternate data source is the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS). Unfortunately, given the small number of villages that received a GSS, the available sample sizes are too small in the PIHS-with the sample restrictions in our paper, we find only 3 villages in the treatment and 31 villages in the control set for these data. Moreover, since the majority of (the few) women who work in non-farm activities are teachers, and the vast majority of private school teachers are women, the private school wage bill is likely to reflect the wages of skilled women. 13 As an example of an underestimate, consider the following wage-bill distributions in villages with and without GHS. In the absence of any demand effects, suppose that private schools can only afford to set up in villages where the wage-bill is below 7. Thus, where we observe the wage-bill, E(W B i |W B i is non missing, no GHS) -E(W B i |W B i is non missing, GHS) is biased towards zero compared to the uncensored E(W B i |no GHS) -E(W B i |GHS).
14 Measures of village infrastructure and public goods are not available in the 1981 census. In 1998, judging from the percentage of households that own land, treatment villages are slightly worse than control villages.
Table II first presents probit results based on Equation (3) . The construction of a GSS increases the probability of a private school in the village by 9.7 percentage points (Column 1). Since 12 percent of all control villages have a private school, this represents an 80 percent increase. An equally significant determinant of private school existence is village population; the GSS effect is similar in magnitude to increasing village population by 2000 individuals (coincidentally a one standard-deviation increase).
The estimated impact remains significant at the 1 percent level with a full set of village-level controls including exposure to other types of public schools, although the point-estimate is somewhat attenuated (Column 2). Introducing location dummies for PCs (Column 3) increases the estimate and significance with magnitudes very similar to the first specification.
Following Equation (5) The near-doubling of the estimated impact of GSS as we progressively account for unobserved components of the error suggests that, even though we observed few differences in baseline characteristics, GSS were not randomly placed. Indeed, it appears that villages where private schools were less likely to arise were disproportionately more likely to receive a GSS. The next section presents the IV results, which show that unobserved time-varying attributes are equally important.
B. Instrumental Variable Specification
The identifying assumptions and results from the instrumental variables specification are presented in the following order. We first examine the variation induced by the instrument, focusing on the first stage and the distribution of eligible villages across the population distribution. We then present the IV estimation results and finally return to the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
Identifying Assumptions
We estimate Equation(3) using Rule i as an instrument for GSS i . Rule i is a valid instrument if (i) the rule predicts GSS construction so that (cov(Rule i , GSS i ) 6 = 0) and (ii) the exclusion restriction is valid: cov(Rule i , ν i + ε it ) = 0, so that the eligibility rule affects the existence of a private school only through the construction of a GSS. Since Rule i is necessarily correlated with population, the exclusion restriction is satisfied only if we explicitly condition on population in Equation(3). Under these two conditions, the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimate of (β 1 + γ 1 ),
is unbiased and consistent as long as there is no direct effect of the population rank-order on private school existence. To clarify the identifying assumptions, Figure IV illustrates how the existence of private schools and the binary instrument covary with 1981 village population. Here we plot Rule i for all villages in our sample (right axis) and the non-parametric relationship between private school location and village population (left axis). We note that there are both "eligible" (Rule i = 1) and "ineligible" (Rule i = 0)
villages at all population levels. We can thus compare two villages with the same population, one of which was eligible to receive the GSS and another that was not, allowing us to exclude the direct effect of population on private school existence. Further, the non-parametric relationship between private school existence and village population is approximately linear; it is therefore likely that linear and quadratic population terms in the regression specification are sufficient to control for the underlying relationship between village population and private school existence. estimate, cov(GSS it , Rule i ). The bottom panel then compares, over the same population quintiles, the percentage of villages with a private school in the "eligible" and "ineligible" groups; this is the reduced form for the IV estimate, cov(P rivate it , GSS it |P op 1981 ). The instrument varies in every population quintile so that our results are not driven by variation in a single population group and for all population quintiles the first-stage indicates that eligible villages were more likely to receive a GSS. In addition, the reduced form suggest that, controlling for population, villages that were eligible to receive a GSS were also more likely to see private schools arise at a later date. Halqa" (QH), which include around 10 PCs (Column 3). 16 The explicit conditioning on polynomial population terms implies that the remaining variation induced by the instrument is non-monotonic and non-linear and therefore likely uncorrelated with omitted variables in Equation(3).
Instrumental Variables Results
Columns 4 to 5 present the corresponding linear IV coefficients. The estimated coefficient of GSS on private school existence increases dramatically compared to the OLS and first-difference specifications and the significance drops to the 10 percent level. 17 While part of this increase can be attributed to selection on time-varying omitted variables, we think it unlikely that these effects are as large as the estimates suggests. Column 6 assesses whether functional specification plays a role. We implement the bivariate probit specification and report the average treatment effect of GSS on the existence of a private school with analytical standard-errors computed using the delta method. 18 The point-estimate from the bivariate probit is less than half that of the linear IV and significant at the 1 percent level of confidence.
The estimate suggests that time-varying omitted variables are correlated to GSS construction, and is double what we obtain with the first-differenced specification. Constructing a GSS increases the probability of a private school in the village by 36 percentage points, or over 300 percent.
C. Threats to Identification: Further Support for the Exclusion Restriction
We can think of two main channels through which the exclusion restriction could fail. First, if entrepreneurs search for the highest returns and choose among villages within a PC, they may choose the village with the highest population. 19 Second, if the government used the same village population-rank criteria for allocating other investments, this may directly affect the returns to private schooling in the village. This is particularly problematic if the PC is used as an administrative unit for making public investment decisions. Our estimates in Tables II and III control for the presence of all types of government schools in addition to GSS which could affect the probability of private school existence, but other omitted public investments could still bias our results. 20 Here, we present historical evidence and further statistical tests to build a case for the validity of the exclusion restriction. The historical record thus suggests that the PC is a administrative unit of contiguous villages with no implications for the allocation of public investments. This record is supported by four robustness checks. We show that (a) there are no observable differences between eligible and ineligible villages, (b) that eligibility matters only to the extent that some village in the PC received a GSS, (c) that eligibility matters more in geographically smaller PCs where the 10Km radius rule will be binding and (d) that the actual assignment of villages to PCs, rather than other attributes of the eligible villages drives our result.
Observable Differences between Eligible and Ineligible Villages
Table IV confirms that there are no baseline differences in educational levels for women and men and the age distribution between eligible and ineligible villages. The only differences are in initial population size, which arises directly from the construction of the instrument. While population growth differs, it is larger in ineligible villages (suggesting convergence in village population) and disappears once we control for initial population. Finally, there are no differences in 1998 in other public investments such as water and electricity or village wealth measured by the extent of permanent housing. The lack of any significant differences in the means-comparisons is also confirmed in a regression setting with controls for village and PC population. However, the vast majority of PCs have none. We divide PCs into two sub-groups-"Program PCs", where at least one village in the PC received a GSS and "Non-Program PCs" where no village received a GSS.
Eligibility Matters only in PCs where some village received a GSS
Even if we do not know how PCs were selected, comparisons across program and non-program PCs are instructive. In particular, if population rank within the PC has no independent effect on the probability of setting up a private school, we should find a strong relationship between private school existence and eligibility for villages in program PCs, but not in non-program PCs. Column 1 in Table V show that for program PCs, eligibility increases the probability of a private school by 14.7 percentage points;
conversely in non-program PCs eligibility has no impact on private school existence (Column 2). Column 3 simultaneously examines the effect of eligibility and being a village in a program PC by regressing private school existence on the interaction between a program PC and an eligible village, conditioning on being a program PC and eligibility separately. In addition, to control for potential differences between program and non-program PCs it also includes the predicted propensity (and its quadratic) of being a program PC, where the prediction is based on observed characteristics. As before, the coefficient of the interaction between GSS and a program PC is large and highly significant; in contrast, the eligibility rule in itself has no effect on private school placement.
Columns 4-6 replicate the first-stage, linear IV and biprobit estimates for program PCs only. The first-stage is now stronger and biprobit estimates are similar to those obtained previously-not surprising, since identification in Table III is achieved only off the variation in program PCs. 21 The linear IV estimate is now smaller and estimated with greater precision. While this lack of a relationship in non-program PCs is encouraging and helps rule out the hypothesis that the private sector locates in the largest village within a PC, it does not necessarily imply that the exclusion restriction is valid since program PCs could be purposively selected; we address this next.
22 21 Consider a binary instrument Z, a treatment, T and a binary outcome variable Y in a sample of N villages. Assume further that these N observations can be divided into M administrative blocks, equivalent to patwar circles in our case. The program operates in M 1 << M blocks. The Wald estimator
E(Y |Z=1)−E(Y |Z=0) E(T |Z=1)−E(T |Z=0)
applied only to program areas is identical to the estimation repeated over the entire sample as long as Z is a valid instrument so that E(Y |Z = 1, Non Pr ogram) = E(Y |Z = 0, Non Pr ogram) Formally, both the numerator and denominator of the Wald estimator are weighted by n 1 n 1 +n 2 when restricted to program areas where n 1 is the number of observations in the program areas and n 1 + n 2 is the size of the full sample. In the presence of covariates the linear IV estimator b
yields similar results. 22 Although, as with eligible villages, we find no differences in observed characteristics between program and non-program PCs.
Eligibility Matters only in geographically smaller PCs
Columns 7-9, Table V present a second falsification exercise, where we use variation in PC land area to directly control for the eligibility criteria. The 10 Km radius rule suggests that population rank in
PCs with large land areas should play a smaller role in determining GSS existence. Column 7 presents a first-stage where we interact the eligibility rule with the inverse of the (square-root of) land area of the PC and directly include the eligibility rule as an additional control. The eligibility rule in itself has no impact on the probability of GSS placement while the interaction between (the inverse of) land area and village top-rank is positive and significant. Consistent with the radius rule, a top ranked village in a large PC is no more likely to receive a GSS than a village that is not top-ranked.
Using only the interaction term as the excluded variable, Column 8 presents the biprobit estimates from this specification, with direct controls for villages that are top-ranked in their own PC and/or in their own Qanoongho-halqa as well as the total PC population and the number of villages in the PC.
Column 9 includes additional interactions between the top-rank rule and the number of villages in the PC and the PC population as controls to address potential concerns arising from direct correlations between land area and the number of villages or the population in the PC. The estimates from these specifications are very similar in size to those obtained previously, although the precision is somewhat reduced due to a weaker first-stage. As before, these results strongly suggest that eligibility on its own is not directly correlated with the existence of a private school.
The Assignment of Villages to PCs matters: A Placebo Experiment
To establish that the actual assignment of villages to PCs are important in generating our result (rather than a feature common to larger villages), we construct the following placebo experiment. Starting from the full sample, we randomly group villages into "fake" PCs with 4 villages in each PC (the median number of villages per PC in our sample) and classify villages as eligible using the new PC classifications. 23 We then apply the sample restrictions discussed in Section IIb and estimate the reduced form relationship, cov(P rivate it , GSS it |P op 1981 ). These steps were then repeated 5000 times to generate a distribution of estimated coefficients under random assignment of villages to PCs.
The actual reduced form coefficient (0.028 and strongly significant) lies within the top 1 percentile of the distribution of reduced form coefficients generated by the fake PC simulations (the mean and median for the fake distribution are essentially 0). In other words, it is extremely unlikely that the coefficient we obtain is an artifact of a village being large-what matters is the specific assignment of villages to PCs.
D. Why do Different Specifications give Different Results? OLS and IV
The differences between the OLS, first-difference and IV results indicate that both time-invariant and time-varying components of the error term are correlated to GSS placement. Further, GSS were systematically placed in villages where private schools were less likely to arise. One interpretationadvanced for instance, by Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons (1995) in Indonesia-is that governments act altruistically, trying to equalize differences between villages. Villages with lower responsiveness of demand to school construction received GSS and these were also the villages where private schools were less likely to locate. A more cynical explanation is that these schools were targeted to villages with powerful local landlords and officials. The context in Pakistan suggests that these are precisely the villages where the demand for education is lower, and less likely to increase over time. Construction in villages with a lower demand for education could thus reflect political-economy considerations rather than a desire for equity.
Linear IV and Bivariate Probit
It is likely that the structure of the data, rather than a failure of the exclusion restriction, accounts 
V Potential Channels: Evidence for supply-side Effects
We now consider whether the causal impact of GSS on the educational market works through a supplyside "women-as-teachers" channel. As described in section III, we do so by examining the impact of GSS on both the quantity and price margins.
Quantity Margin:
If private schools arise because of the availability of "women as teachers", we expect a larger impact of GSS compared to other types of public schooling. Columns 1-2 in Table VI present Although this appears to be a small effect, it represents a change in the stock of educated women. Since It is worth pointing out here that another possibility to isolate the supply-side is to use variation in the timing of the public school construction. Supply-side channels suggest that private schools will emerge 5-8 years after the construction of a GSS. Unfortunately, the data are too limited to exploit this variation. We require villages with both private schools and GSS. Since only 328 villages received a GSS, and of these, 30 percent had a private school, we are unable to identify any discontinuities using the 90 or so villages that have both. An alternate strategy is to check whether there is a difference in the existence of a private school based on years of exposure to a GSS. Here we do find evidence that less than 5 years of exposure has no effect on the likelihood of private school existence. In particular, private schools exist in 18 percent of villages with less than 5 years of exposure to a GSS (compared to 12 percent among the control villages), and in 33 percent of those with 5 or more years.
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These results constrain the routes through which a demand-side story can work: It must be the case that fathers' education does not stimulate demand for children's' education (since boys' schools have no effect) and that primary schooling for mothers is not enough (and that the effect show up after 5 years of GSS exposure). Moreover, mothers' schooling must have a non-linear effect on the demand for children's education.
Price Margin:
Table VII provides evidence on the price margin; we compare the wage-bill in private schools in villages with and without GSS using data from the private school census. Column 1 presents the OLS results in the sample of villages for which we have teacher wage data. 25 The results are large and significant and show the presence of a dominant supply-side channel. Private schools in villages with a GSS report an 18 percent lower wage-bill. The results are similar to the OLS estimates, with estimates of 18-19 percent suggesting that selection into the non-zero wage sample is of limited importance. 25 This is slightly smaller than the number of villages where there is a private school since in a few cases in the PEIP data private schools did not report wages. 26 Attenuation bias from a noisy measures of women's wages (average wages in private schools), suggests the actual differential may be even higher. However, can increased demand lead to lower wages? While a standard labor market model predicts the opposite, more elaborate demand-side explanations that allow the quality of teachers to vary are possible (i.e. the wage drop indicates lower quality teachers being hired). We believe such stories are neither plausible nor empirically supported. For example, if increased demand spurs "perverse" competition across (private) schools (with parents unable to judge/evaluate quality), this would lead to hiring worse teachers. Yet not only is this implausible since parents are quite aware of teacher quality (Andrabi et. al. 2006b ), but our regressions control for the number of schools and show that villages with more schools have higher wages -competition raises (not perversely lowers) wages. Column 7 presents similar results using the female/male ratio for children under the age of 4 as an indicator of gender bias. Arguably, villages with a lower female/male ratio may be more conservative with fewer labor market opportunities for women outside the immediate vicinity of the house. Indeed, villages at the 25th percentile of the distribution (female/male ratio of 0.89) see a far greater wage decline of 27 percent due to GSS construction compared to 8 percent for villages at the 75th percentile of the distribution (female/male ratio of 1.04). While encouraging, these results are at best tentative; endogenous variation as well as the suitability of these two indicators as proxies for the restrictiveness of the female labor market require that they be viewed with some caution.
Taken together with the results on the quantity margin, these wage-bill results present direct evidence that supply-side constraints arising from the potential supply of female teachers are important for the location decisions of private schools. GSS reduce the wage-bills of private schools by increasing the supply of potential female teachers in the village where they are constructed.
VI Conclusion
Efforts to achieve universal primary education remain an elusive goal in most developing countries.
While governments can choose to invest greater amounts in providing and subsidizing the costs of public schooling, the budgetary implications of such a task are daunting. Private educational provision is an increasing presence, particularly in developing countries with shares exceeding 20 percent at the primary level in a large number of countries. The crucial question is: Can the market offer quality and affordable education and complement the public sector in achieving universal enrollment goals? This paper offers evidence that alleviating local supply-side constraints can support the provision of education in developing countries. In our case, the supply-side channel works through the creation of private schools as a consequence of greater teacher supply. Over time, government school investments "crowd-in" private sector involvement. One implication is a role for public investment-led growth, as in the "big-push" arguments advanced by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) . In contrast to the literature that calls for larger primary compared to secondary school investments, our findings suggest that both play a role. That the students in today's schools are the potential repositories of human capital for the next generation implies that low-income countries can enter a "virtuous cycle" by investing heavily in the creation of a cohort with secondary education.
Comparing the results from the restricted sample to those for the full sample in Appendix Table   IV also sheds some light on short versus longer term dynamics. In particular, over the 20-year period of the restricted sample, the estimated impacts of GSS on private school existence and on teachers' wages are stronger than in the full sample. In addition, for the full sample, there is a suggestion that wage declines arising from GSS construction follow a quadratic path with steep initial declines that are reversed later on. These differences are broadly consistent with explanations arising from a widening female labor market due to village exogamy as well as with longer term secular changes in demand as the stock of secondary school educated women increases. To the extent that it is the former, the availability of teachers remains a constraint on the provision of education even in the long-term.
The results on how girls' secondary schools lead to the creation of private schools in the next generation are a testimony to the resilience of the private sector. Villages with girl's secondary schools are also those with a larger stock of educated women, who can then teach in private schools. With limited mobility, a private school entrepreneur becomes a virtual monopsonist when located in such a village.
At one level, this seems like a pernicious outcome: Women receive lower wages in the labor market compared to men for the same job. At the same time, labor market restrictions on women lead to lower cost private schools. If households are credit constrained, this is analogous to Ramsey second-best pricing in the case of market failures-it suggests that fixing one particular problem with the market (labor immobility) may lead to worse educational outcomes if the second (credit constraints) remains in place.
A natural question is whether the increase in the supply of potential teachers has led to an improvement in educational provision or a sectoral shift from public to private schools. There are several reasons to think that, at least in Pakistan, the emergence of private schools has improved overall education in the country. Based on a representative sample of households in the country (the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 1998), Appendix Table I, Panel B shows that overall enrollment is significantly higher for villages with private schools (61 percent vs. 46 percent), as is female enrollment (56 percent vs. 35 percent). In villages with private schools, 17 percent of the households in the poorest tercile are enrolled in private schools, which is comparable to the percentage of private school enrollment among the rich in villages without such schools (18 percent). 28 For the data used in this paper, enrollment rates in villages with private schools are 13 percentage points higher after conditioning on the presence of all types of public schooling, village population and wealth, and accounting for all PC-level time-invariant factors (see regressions given Appendix Table   III) . 29 Given the importance of the distance to school as a determinant of enrollment, particularly at the primary age and particularly for girls, this is partly due to a decrease in the average distance to test-scores of children in rural private schools are higher than those of their government counterparts. In tests we administered to class 3 students, those in private schools outperformed public school students by 0.9 standard deviations in English, and 0.39 standard deviations in Mathematics (Appendix Table I , Panel C). While selection into private schools may explain part of the difference, there is only a small change in the private-public learning gap after controlling for child, household, and village attributes. 30 While establishing causality for these findings is empirically difficult, the size of the differences in raw comparisons and with additional covariates, presents strong prima facie evidence that alleviating supply constraints has led to more than a sectoral shift in the composition of education. Like in other low-income countries, private schools appear to offer high(er) quality education at far lower costs-the unionization and pay-grade of public teachers implies that per-child costs of private schools is half that of Our results also provide a glimpse of education in high-income countries during the early to midtwentieth century, and particularly the debate on the effect of increasing labor force participation for women on the quality of teachers. The rise of private schools in Pakistan suggest that in low-income countries at least, there is still a large "implicit-subsidy" to education from low female labor-force participation, making the case for investment in secondary education for women even stronger. 29 While one may be tempted to "instrument" for private school existence in these regressions using the population toprank instrument used in the paper (and we get even larger results if we do so), we do not believe the exclusion restriction is defensible in this case i.e. top-ranked villages are both more likely to get a GSS and (in turn) a private school, and both these factors directly lead to increased enrollment. 30 These results contrast with results from the US, where raw differences between private and public schools tend to be large, but differences are sharply reduced with demographic and location controls (Figlio and Stone 1997) Appendix I Selection Issues in the Wage Bill Since we only observe the wage bill in villages where there is a private school, a concern described in the main text is that simple OLS estimates may be biased if such selection is not accounted for. Here we provide details on two approaches we use in the paper to address such concerns. Following Angrist (1995) , the problem can be formally stated as follows. The wage-bill is determined through a linear equation conditional on the existence of a private school
and a censoring equation (denoting W B i = I as the indicator for whether W B i is non-missing)
The instrument Z i determines a first stage
Given the validity of the instrument, Z i , we assume that cov(τ i , Z i ) = 0. Then, (9) above. Thus, although Z i is a valid instrument for the decision to setup a private school, it is not a valid instrument in equation (9) . There are two potential solutions.
Following Heckman (1979) if we assume that (ε i , ν i , τ i ) are jointly normally distributed, homoskedastic and independent of Z i , we obtain the familiar "mills-ratio" as the relevant expectation function conditional on participation. That is,
Φ(λ(δγ+δμZi)) and φ(.) and Φ(.) are the density and distribution functions of the normal distribution for ν i − δτ i . This mills-ratio can is then directly included in equation (9) as the appropriate selection-correction.
An alternative approach, proposed by Heckman and Robb (1986) and developed by Ahn and Powell (1993) uses the "control-function" approach, where we condition on the predicted probability of W B i = 1 in equation (9) . In essence, this method proposes to estimate β by using pair-wise differences in W B i for two villages (in our case) for which the non-parametric probability of participation is very close. The approach is implemented by first estimating equation (10) directly, and then including the predicted probability of participation (and its polynomials) as additional controls in equation (9) .
Appendix II
Comparing Linear IV and Biprobit estimates Chiburish, Das and Lokshin (2006) show that in the model given by
with (ε 1 , ε 2 ) jointly distributed as standard bivariate normal with correlation ρ, p T = (T = 1) and p Y = (Y = 1), the the local average treatment effect or LATE estimated by the linear IV is approximated by
and the asymptotic variance is approximated by
.
Asymptotic variance of the IV estimator increases as p Y gets closer to 1/2 and as p T gets closer to 0, both of which characterize the case discussed here. The table shows the relationship between the existence of a private school and GSS. Columns (1) and (2) estimate non-linear probability models (probit) and column (3) the corresponding linear specification. Columns (4) and (5) present results from the village-level first-differenced specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) The first three columns in the table show the first-stage of the IV strategy. Column (1) shows the bivariate correlation between the eligibility rule an GSS. Columns (2) and (3) are the corresponding first-stages for Columns (4) and (5); Column (6) reports the estimated marginal impact of GSS and standard-errors for a bivariate probit specification (xx represents variables included in the regression, but whose marginal coefficients and standard errors we have not estimated for computational convenience Columns (1) and (2) presented the reduced form estimates for the Program PC (a PC where at least one village received a GSS after 1981) and non-Program PC samples (the latter serves as a falsification test for our Instrument). Column (3) repeats the same exercise in Columns (1) ans (2) but pools the two samples and controls for the fact that the program and non-program PCs may be different but including polynomial selection (into being a village in a program PC) terms and ensuring common support. Column (4) in the table show the first-stage of the IV strategy in the reduced sample of "Program-PCs" only. Column (5) is the second-stage for the linear IV estimator; Column (6) reports the estimated marginal impact of GSS and standard-errors for a bivariate probit specification (xx represents variables included in the regression, but whose marginal coefficients and standard errors are not estimated for computational convenience).
Column (7) presents the first-stage of a more demanding IV strategy where the instrument is the interaction between the GSS Rule and the (inverse) width (square root of area) of the PC i.e. we identify only of top-rank in small (area) PCs since the radius rule is more likely to bind. Column (8) reports the estimated marginal impact of GSS and standard-errors for a bivariate probit specification where only this interaction terms is used as an instrument. Column (9) reports the estimated marginal impact of GSS and standard-errors for an even more demanding bivariate probit specification where we also control for level and interaction terms between the GSS rule and both the number of villages in a PC and the total population of the PC to ensure that our instrument is indeed only identifying off geiprahical distance interacted with the GSS Rule.Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (5) examine the relationship between average wage bill in private schools and government high schools. Column (1) runs an OLS specification. Columns (2)-(3) run a Heckman selection model to take into account the fact that the LHS variable is only observed in villages where private schools exist. Column (3) differs in that it includes an additional instrument for the selection stage -the number of government boys primary schools. Columns (4)-(5) present an alternate "control function" method to account for the selection issue by directly including polynomials in the predicted probability of observing a positive wage in the wage regression. Column (5) differs in that it includes an additional instrument for the selection stage -the number of government boys primary schools. Columns (6) and (7) re-estimate (1) but allow for the treatment effect to vary across village type by interacting the treatment with a development (percentage of villages houses that have water -Column (6)) and gender-bias (sex-ratio for children under 4 years of age -Column (7)) indicator. Note: The figure plots the predicted probability of private school existence against the percentage of secondaryeducated males and females in the village. Movements along the curve show the increase in probability with increases in the percentage of secondary-educated females; each different curve shows increases with increases in the percentage of secondary-educated men. The predictions are based on a probit regression. The data is based on the census of private schools (Federal Bureau of Statistics) matched to village-level census data for Punjab (Population Census Organization). 
